feat!: harden raw browser control and packaging
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- Add safe-by-default policy gates for raw command surfaces: command, script, and serve-http /command. - Require explicit opt-ins for page reads, browser control, and high-risk commands such as dom.eval, storage.*, and screenshots. - Remove all cookies support from CLI, SDK, extension commands, permissions, constants, docs, and tests. - Add diagnostic, events, watch, workspace, remote, raw command, script, HTTP gateway, tree-view, session import/export, and extension info/capability commands. - Add Chrome Web Store packaging that strips manifest.key while keeping local packages with a stable native-messaging extension ID. - Bump browser-cli and extension version to 0.14.1 and cover the new behavior with pytest and extension packaging tests. BREAKING CHANGE: cookies commands and the b.cookies SDK namespace have been removed; generic raw command execution now blocks non-safe commands unless explicitly allowed.
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@@ -133,19 +133,19 @@ _LOOPBACK_HOSTS = {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"}
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@click.option("--token", default=None, metavar="SECRET",
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help="Shared bearer token required from callers (sent as 'Authorization: Bearer ...').")
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@click.option("--insecure", is_flag=True, default=False,
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help="Run with NO token. Grants full browser control (cookies, pages) to anyone who can reach the port.")
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help="Run with NO token. Grants full browser control to anyone who can reach the port.")
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@click.pass_context
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def cmd_link_serve(ctx, host, port, token, insecure):
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"""Serve this browser to the ServiceLink mesh over HTTP /rpc.
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Exposes the running browser (open/scrape pages, read cookies and storage), so
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Exposes the running browser (open/scrape pages, read storage), so
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a token is required by default. Bind to loopback and keep the port off the
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public network.
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"""
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if not token and not insecure:
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raise click.ClickException(
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"Refusing to start without --token (this endpoint can control your browser "
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"and read its cookies). Pass --insecure to override on a trusted host."
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"and read page/storage data). Pass --insecure to override on a trusted host."
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)
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if host not in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS:
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click.echo(
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